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IntroductIon
Like clock-work, as US gasoline prices approached $4 a gallon 
in spring 2011, energy security moved to the forefront of the 
American political debate. Global oil prices have recovered 
from their collapse during the financial crisis more quickly 
than expected due to resilient developing-country demand and 
political instability throughout the Middle East and North 
Africa. As with past oil price spikes, politicians have been quick 
to offer silver bullet solutions to lower gas prices and make 
America more energy secure. But given the complexity of the 
US energy system and global energy markets, it is difficult for 
even informed observers to evaluate how far current proposals 
go in solving the country’s energy security challenges. 
To help inform the debate, we model a range of recent 
policy proposals, from expanded offshore drilling to new vehicle 
efficiency standards, analyzing their potential effect on US oil 
imports, gasoline prices, and energy expenditures, among other 
metrics, in a way that allows readers to compare the strengths 
and weaknesses of each. We then assess the potential impact 
of all the proposals combined to see whether what is currently 
being discussed is sufficient to address the issue. 
We find that despite recent political rhetoric, when it 
comes to energy security there is no policy panacea. Current 
proposals  vary  widely  in  the  time  frame,  magnitude,  and 
nature of their impact. Rather than debate whether expanded 
domestic production, improved efficiency, or development of 
oil alternatives is the right course to take, the United States 
needs to start moving down all three roads simultaneously to 
significantly alter the country’s energy trajectory. 
Even if all proposals currently on the table are adopted, 
the United States will remain vulnerable to international oil-
In an economy that relies so heavily on oil, rising prices at the pump affect everybody—
workers, farmers, truck drivers, restaurant owners, students who are lucky enough to 
have a car. Businesses see rising prices at the pump hurt their bottom line. Families feel 
the pinch when they fill up their tank. And for Americans that are already struggling 
to get by, a hike in gas prices really makes their lives that much harder. It hurts.
President Barack Obama
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market disruptions for years to come, with all the attendant 
economic and national security consequences. We conclude 
by highlighting steps Washington can take to make the inter-
national oil market more stable and secure, something that’s 
largely missing from the current policy debate. 
AmerIcA’s energy securIty chAllenge
Americans are increasingly concerned about energy. In Gallup 
(2011) tracking polls over the past year, growth in the number 
of respondents who worry a “great deal” about the availability 
and affordability of energy has been far more rapid than for 
any other issue. In response, during the first five months of 
the 112th Congress alone, US senators and representatives 
introduced  26  bills  intended  to  improve  American  energy 
security  and  31  bills  aspiring  to  make  the  United  States 
energy  independent.  President  Barack  Obama  has  moved 
energy security to the forefront of his domestic policy agenda, 
releasing a Blueprint for a Secure Energy Future on March 30, 
2011 (White House 2011c). On June 23, 2011, the adminis-
tration announced that the United States would be releasing 
30 million barrels of oil from the strategic petroleum reserve 
in an attempt to prevent high oil prices from undermining a 
nascent economic recovery. Energy security discussions, while 
still marginal, are increasing in frequency and prominence in 
international diplomatic forums like the G-20. 
Yet energy security remains poorly defined as a policy 
objective (Levi 2010). A 2006 Council on Foreign Relations 
report describes energy security simply as “the reliable and 
affordable supply of energy” (Deutch, Schlesinger, and Victor 
2006). A 2009 study from the RAND Corporation opts for 
a detailed and qualitative description of the various ways in 
which US energy use (oil in particular) impacts the county’s 
economic and foreign policy objectives (Crane et al. 2009). 
The  US  Chamber  of  Commerce  quantifies  energy  security 
through its Index of US Energy Security Risk (Institute for 
21st Century Energy 2010).1 
Drawing  on  these  studies  and  others,  we  offer  the 
following  framework  for  understanding  America’s  energy 
security challenge before evaluating the effectiveness of current 
policy proposals in making the country more energy secure. 
1. All three studies reject “energy independence” as a policy goal, despite its 
use in Washington political discourse, with the view that it is neither feasible 
nor desirable for the United States to be isolated from global energy markets 
(a view we share). David Greene of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory takes 
issue with this characterization, arguing that while “energy autarky” may not 
be feasible or desirable, “energy independence” is achievable if the economic 
costs of oil dependence for the United States are small enough to “have no 
effect on its economic, military or foreign policies” (Greene 2010). According 
to Greene, the United States was energy independent between 1991 and 1998. 
Economic Security
Energy, along with labor, land, and capital, is a basic ingredient 
in America’s economic growth formula. As with other factors 
of production, increased energy costs not offset through effi-
ciency  gains  reduce  the  economy’s  growth  potential.  Over 
the past century the energy intensity of the US economy (the 
amount of coal, oil, natural gas, and other forms of energy 
required to produce each dollar of output) has declined by 
75 percent thanks to improvements in energy efficiency and a 
structural shift from agriculture and manufacturing to service-
sector activities (figure 1). But the amount of money Americans 
spend on energy as a share of national income has not seen a 
commensurate decline. US expenditures on fossil fuels (either 
domestically produced or imported from abroad) has averaged 
between 2 to 3 percent of GDP for most of the past 100 years, 
with the exception of the early 1980s and the last few years, 
when fossil fuel costs exceeded 5 percent of GDP (figure 2). 
If one includes energy transformation costs (e.g., petroleum 
refining and power generation), wholesale and retail margins, 
and non–fossil fuel expenditures, the share of national income 
spent on energy grew from 8 percent in 1971 to 14 percent in 
1981 and then again from 6 percent in 1998 to 11 percent in 
2008 (Bureau of Economic Analysis 2011a, EIA 2010a). For 
context, this is similar in scale to recent health care cost escala-
tion. Between 1998 and 2008, US health care costs increased 
by $1.2 trillion while energy costs increased by $1 trillion (EIA 
2010a, Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services 2011).
As shown in figure 2, most of the volatility in American 
energy expenditures over the past 50 years has come from oil 
price fluctuations. Events abroad have largely determined the 
price of oil in the United States. The oil industry was born 
in the United States (Yergin 1991) and America is still the 
world’s  third  largest  oil  producer  (BP  2011). Yet  domestic 
supply  has  not  kept  pace  with  domestic  demand,  and  the 
United States now imports more than half the oil it consumes. 
As US imports account for just under one-quarter of global 
oil trade, the country plays an important role in shaping the 
global oil market. But the market is also strongly affected by 
the other two heavyweights, the Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC) and emerging Asia. 
OPEC, the oil producers’ cartel formed in 1960, accounts 
for 42 percent of global oil production and 70 percent of global 
proven reserves.2 OPEC attempts to maximize its members’ 
oil revenue through production quotas (Gately 2007, Gately 
et al. 2004). This requires identifying and targeting a “gold-
ilocks” global oil price—one high enough to meet OPEC’s 
2. Includes Canadian oil sands reserve estimates beyond those listed as “under 
active development” by the Canadian government. N u m b e r   Pb1 1 - 1 0   Ju Ne  2 0 1 1
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current  revenue  needs  but  low  enough  to  avoid  demand 
destruction  or  development  of  oil  substitutes  that  would 
threaten medium- and long-term revenue prospects. It also 
requires maintaining meaningful amounts of spare capacity, 
something  too  expensive  for  an  individual  oil  company 
without the ability to impact global prices. As a result OPEC, 
and within OPEC Saudi Arabia in particular, has served as a 
sort of “central bank of oil,” increasing supply when prices 
get “too high” and reducing supply when prices get “too low” 
(McNally and Levi 2011). 
Yet while OPEC has the ability to combat price volatility, 
the cartel and individual OPEC member states have also been 
a leading source of instability in global oil markets. An OPEC 
oil embargo during the 1973 Arab-Israeli helped drive the 
first major oil price spike of the 20th century (Yergin 1991). 
Individual OPEC countries are among the world’s more polit-
ically unstable states, with 75 percent of OPEC oil produc-
tion in 2010 coming from countries classified as either “high 
risk” or “very high risk” by the Economist Intelligence Unit’s 
Political Instability Index.3 And there have been two major 
wars between OPEC members—the Iran-Iraq war and Iraq’s 
invasion of Kuwait. Taken together, OPEC embargos, unrest 
within individual OPEC producers, and outright war between 
OPEC  member  states  have  been  responsible  for  roughly 
70  percent  of  geopolitical  or  conflict-related  global  supply 
disruptions since 1950 (Beccue and Huntington 2005), while 
over the same period they accounted for less than 40 percent 
of global supply. 
OPEC supply shocks were primarily to blame for the four 
largest oil price spikes between 1970 and 2000 (Hamilton 
2011,  Hamilton  2009a,  Kilian  2009).  But  OPEC  as  well 
as non-OPEC supply remained relatively stable during the 
2000–2008 price spike. That spike was driven primarily by 
the other oil-market heavyweight: emerging Asia, China in 
particular. Figure 3 shows the difference in the International 
Energy  Agency’s  (IEA)  2002  and  the  Energy  Information 
Administration’s (EIA) 2003 global oil demand projections for 
2008 and actual demand that year. Their forecasts for global 
supply were quite accurate, within 0.9 percent for IEA and 
0.1 percent for EIA, which isn’t too surprising as most of the 
new production capacity slated to come online by 2008 was 
already in the pipeline when the reports were published. 
But emerging Asia grew much faster than expected. In 
the case of China, which accounted for a large portion of the 
global demand surprise, economic growth got more energy-
intensive (Rosen and Houser 2007). As prices rose above the 
$25 to $30 (in 2011 dollars) projected by EIA and IEA, so 
3. The index is available at http://viewswire.eiu.com.
did export revenue, economic growth, and energy demand 
in  oil-exporting  countries,  which  further  increased  prices. 
Crude averaged $78 a barrel in 2007 and $104 a barrel in 
2008 (also in 2011 dollars). Given global supply constraints, 
these  prices  destroyed  enough  demand  in  OECD  coun-
tries, both through improved efficiency and lower economic 
growth, to make room for increased demand in China and 
the Middle East (Hamilton 2009a), a phenomenon known as 
“demand-rationing.” 
Demand and supply shocks result in seemingly outsized 
swings in global oil prices because oil demand and supply 
are both highly inelastic in the short term (Hamilton 2009b, 
Greene  and  Ahmad  2005,  Goldman  Sachs  2010a).  In  the 
United  States,  over  70  percent  of  oil  consumption  takes 
place in the transportation sector, where fuel substitutes are 
limited and Americans’ ability to drive less is constrained by 
the limited availability of mass transit alternatives. In devel-
oping countries demand elasticity is even lower. In China, 
rapid income growth offsets some of the impact of higher oil 
prices, and industry (still the majority of Chinese oil demand) 
is often able to pass price increases along to foreign consumers. 
In the Middle East, economic growth increases along with oil 
prices and oil export revenue is used to reduce the price of 
gasoline and diesel for domestic consumers. On the supply 
side, new oil production projects take years to develop and 
bring online. The only short-term buffers are consumer inven-
tories and OPEC spare capacity—both of which were burned 
through relatively quickly between 2000 and 2008. 
Oil  price  spikes,  caused  by  either  supply  or  demand 
shocks, impact US economic security in the following ways:
1.  Reduced Income: Given Americans’ limited short-term 
ability to change the car they drive or how often they drive 
it in the face of higher oil prices, households generally 
absorb higher oil costs (up to a point) and cut spending in 
other areas. This has the same effect as a reduction in total 
household income and can significantly impact economic 
growth. 
2.  Increased  Uncertainty:  In  addition  to  reducing  the 
amount of money Americans have to spend, sudden oil 
price movements create uncertainty about just where they 
should spend it. Consumers delay purchases (particularly 
automobiles) and businesses delay investment decisions 
(particularly in manufacturing, transportation, and logis-
tics) where future oil price is an important consideration. 
This impacts economic growth beyond the direct income 
effects of higher prices. 
3.  Dislocation Costs: Oil price movements change not only 
consumer and business decisions about the future but N u m b e r   Pb1 1 - 1 0   Ju Ne  2 0 1 1
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also the value of the decisions consumers and businesses 
have made in the past. An SUV purchased when gasoline 
costs $1 per gallon looks a lot less attractive with prices 
at $4 per gallon. If the SUV’s owner is forced to sell the 
vehicle before he would have at $1 gas, and at a lower 
resale price, that creates economic inefficiency. Likewise 
for the SUV manufacturer left with underutilized manu-
facturing assets or the logistics company that has to make 
significant changes to its distribution networks.
4.  Wealth Transfers:  As  the  United  States  is  a  large  oil 
importer, rising oil prices increase the US trade deficit 
and decrease US terms of trade (the amount of imports 
a country can purchase with its export revenue). While 
this transfer of wealth to oil-producing countries does 
not necessarily reduce global economic growth, it reduces 
US  national  income  and  relative  weight  in  the  global 
economy.4 In 2008 net US oil imports accounted for 47 
percent of America’s trade deficit, while trade with China 
accounted for only 32 percent (figure 4).
5.  Monetary Tightening:  All  else  equal,  rising  oil  prices 
increase the odds that the Federal Reserve will raise US 
interest rates. While as a general practice central banks 
pay attention to core inflation (excludes food and energy) 
rather than headline inflation (includes food and energy), 
sustained oil price increases translate into core inflation as 
workers demand higher wages to make up for increased 
oil costs and businesses raise prices to cover both these 
wage increases and their own oil costs. In addition, with 
headline inflation outpacing core inflation for most of the 
past decade, some central bankers are now paying closer 
attention to food and energy prices when making interest 
rate decisions (Smaghi 2011). 
The cumulative effect of these five factors depends impor-
tantly on the severity of the shock (how many barrels per day) 
and its duration. There are also differences between supply and 
demand shocks in how they impact the economy. Noting that 
oil shocks have preceded five of the past six US recessions (figure 
5), the academic literature puts their cost at between 0.5 and 5 
percent of GDP (Kilian 2009; Hamilton 2009a; Huntington 
2005; Jones, Leiby, and Paik 2004; Leiby 2007). The current 
consensus among private-sector analyses is that a $10 and $20 
sustained increase in crude oil prices translates into a 0.2 and 
0.5 percent reduction in GDP, respectively (Goldman Sachs 
4. The precise impact of rising oil prices on the US current account balance 
depends on a wide range of factors covered well in (Kilian, Rebucci, and 
Spatafora 2009). 
2011; JP Morgan 2011; Morgan Stanley 2011; Deutsche Bank 
2011; Credit Suisse 2011; Macquarie 2011).
It is important to note that the impact on the US economy 
of an increase in oil prices resulting from a supply or demand 
shock is fundamentally different than that from changes in 
domestic tax policy. Even at current prices, US drivers pay 
significantly less for gasoline and diesel than their counter-
parts in Europe or Japan due to differences in tax policy.5 For 
example, the average US driver paid $0.41 per gallon in gaso-
line taxes in June 2011 while the average German driver paid 
$4.89 per gallon. Fuel taxes are a domestic revenue transfer 
rather  than  an  international  wealth  transfer,  and  they  are 
generally implemented gradually and with sufficient advanced 
warning to avoid most of the economic damage associated 
with demand or supply shocks. To the extent that fuel taxes 
reduce oil demand, they may in fact make an economy more 
resilient to international oil-market disruptions. 
National Security
Oil  affects  American  foreign  policy,  defense  posture,  and 
domestic  security  in  addition  to  its  economy.  Oil-supply 
concerns  shaped  World  War  II’s  trajectory  and  awoke  US 
policymakers to the fact that in the most extreme military 
conflicts, countries’ ability to physically secure enough oil to 
power their militaries can potentially decide outcomes (Yergin 
1991). Today, the US military accounts for only 2 percent of 
US oil consumption. So the oil requirements of conflicts like 
those taking place in Iraq and Afghanistan do not begin to test 
the adequacy of current domestic oil supply (the logistics of 
getting that oil to the battlefield is a significant security issue 
but a separate point). Ensuring reliable supply to the rest of 
the US economy, however, is also a national security concern 
and an important objective of the US defense community. 
The fact that OPEC countries account for half of global 
oil exports (figure 6) combined with the cartel’s history of 
using oil as a geopolitical weapon against the United States 
leaves  many  US  defense  planners  nervous  about  potential 
American vulnerability. Fortunately, producer embargoes have 
had limited effectiveness in achieving their policy objectives in 
the past (Crane et al. 2009), and with certain OPEC members 
depending on oil revenues to maintain political stability in 
the face of the Arab Spring and the cartel’s coherence faltering 
(discussed  below),  the  odds  of  a  politically  driven  supply 
embargo are low. A terrorist attack that disables critical oil 
5. See www.eia.gov/emeu/international/prices.html for a list of current global 
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infrastructure,  however,  is  a  risk  policymakers  are  more 
concerned with in the wake of September 11. 
US  economic  vulnerability  to  international  oil-market 
disruptions  can  limit  America’s  ability  to  pursue  other 
foreign policy objectives, such as democratization or human 
rights  protection,  with  major  oil-exporting  states.  The  fact 
that Washington has sanctioned large oil producers, such as 
Iraq, Libya, and Iran, even when global oil supply is tight, 
suggests this constraint might be less significant than often 
suggested.6 It remains a prominent concern within the foreign 
policy community nonetheless. Oil-export revenues have also 
enabled some countries, Iran and Venezuela in particular, to 
pursue  policies  contrary  to  US  interests,  though  countries 
without oil wealth (e.g., North Korea) have pursued similar 
paths (Crane et al. 2009). 
Growing  demand  in  developing  countries  has  created 
concerns among some in the West that a scramble for resources 
looms  between  established  and  emerging  oil  consumers. 
Increased  overseas  investments  by  Chinese  and  Indian  oil 
companies in recent years and news reports of these companies 
signing “equity deals” with oil-producing states have fed such 
fears. These investments have not had a noticeable impact on 
the fungibility of the global oil market to date (Houser 2008). 
But if they become more pervasive in the years ahead, long-
term  Chinese  or  Indian  supply  contracts  could  potentially 
constrain America’s ability to adapt to future supply disrup-
tions. Oil dependence can shape Chinese and Indian policy 
towards oil-producing states just as it has in the United States. 
Finally,  oil  use  also  impacts  US  national  security  by 
contributing to global climate change (Verrastro et al. 2010). 
Noting  it  will  “contribute  to  food  and  water  scarcity,  will 
increase the spread of disease, and may spur or exacerbate mass 
migration” and “act as an accelerant of instability or conflict,” 
the Department of Defense (2010) in its 2010 Quadrennial 
Defense  Review  highlights  climate  change  as  a  key  factor 
shaping the global security landscape. 
Quantifying these national security costs, which are addi-
tional to the economic costs already discussed, is extremely 
challenging. Estimates have ranged from $13 billion to $149 
billion per year, not including the potential costs of an Iranian 
nuclear program or of missed opportunities to advance democ-
racy or human rights. RAND’s 2009 study estimates that the 
US defense budget could be reduced by 12 to 15 percent if 
oil security was no longer a consideration (Crane et al. 2009).
6. We thank Frank Verrastro of the Center for Strategic and International 
Studies for this point.
The Challenge Going Forward
There is both good news and bad news for US energy security 
in the years ahead. The good news is that US oil imports are 
already  declining.  Increased  domestic  oil  output,  expanded 
biofuels production, and the 2012–16 vehicle efficiency stan-
dards  are  projected  to  reduce  net  US  oil  imports  from  11 
million barrels per day (bpd) in 2008 to just under 9 million 
bpd by 2035 (EIA 2011a). If Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) 
reserves prove to be at the higher end of current estimates, net 
oil imports could decline to as little as 8 million bpd by 2035, 
even without opening additional areas of the OCS for explo-
ration. An upside surprise in onshore tight oil production,7 
which some industry observers now predict, would reduce US 
oil imports even further. Increased domestic production will 
be augmented by new unconventional oil supply from Canada 
imported by pipeline.
The bad news is that with demand growth in developing 
countries set to remain strong for years to come (figure 7) and 
non-OPEC supply growth outside the Western Hemisphere 
projected  to  remain  relatively  constrained  (figure  8),  both 
EIA and IEA believe global oil prices will rise in the years 
ahead (EIA 2011a, IEA 2010a). That means that while US 
oil imports will decline in quantity, the amount of money 
Americans spend on imported oil will continue to increase in 
absolute terms and decline only modestly as a share of GDP. 
Given that biofuels and domestic oil prices move in tandem 
with the price of imported crude, US vulnerability to global 
demand shocks or supply disruptions (increasingly likely given 
the picture painted by figures 7 and 8) will remain relatively 
unchanged based on current projections. 
ProPosed PolIcy resPonse
Recent policy proposals respond to this challenge by seeking 
to (1) further increase domestic US oil production, (2) further 
reduce US oil demand through energy efficiency, and/or (3) 
develop and promote alternative fuels to displace oil consump-
tion. For this analysis, we have selected a range of representa-
tive policy proposals in each group and analyze their potential 
impact, both individually and in combination. 
Accelerate Gulf of Mexico Leasing and Permitting
Since taking control of the US House of Representatives in 
January 2011, congressional Republicans have made increasing 
7. Tight oil refers to a type of unconventional oil currently being produced 
in the United States, North Dakota in particular, using hydraulic fracturing 
techniques similar to those employed in shale gas development. N u m b e r   Pb1 1 - 1 0   Ju Ne  2 0 1 1
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domestic oil production one of their top legislative objectives. 
In particular, Republican leadership has focused on returning 
the rate at which new leases and drilling permits are issued for 
Gulf of Mexico (GoM) oil and gas development to pre–oil spill 
levels. In March 2011, the House passed three bills intended 
to achieve that objective—the Restarting American Offshore 
Leasing Now Act (US House of Representatives 2011), Putting 
the  Gulf  of  Mexico  Back  to  Work  Act  (GPO  2011a),  and 
Reversing President Obama’s Offshore Moratorium Act (GPO 
2011b).  While  the  corresponding  Senate  bill,  the  Offshore 
Production and Safety Act of 2011 (GPO 2011c), failed due to 
lack of Democratic support, the House bills attracted between 
21 and 33 moderate Democrats in that chamber, and oil-state 
Democrats in the Senate have signaled their support for scaled-
back versions of the House bills. 
Given the range of legislative proposals and the difficulty 
in assessing their exact impact on GoM oil and gas produc-
tion, we opt instead to simply return to EIA’s pre–oil spill esti-
mates of lease and permit approval rates and GoM exploration 
costs. This should provide a reasonable upper-bound estimate 
of what any of the individual pieces of legislation would be 
able to achieve.8  
Increase Offshore Access
The Western and Central regions of the GoM are currently 
the only parts of the Outer Continental Shelf open to new 
exploration  and  development.  A  month  before  the  explo-
sion  at  Deepwater  Horizon,  the  Obama  administration 
released  plans  to  open  waters  along  the  Atlantic  coastline, 
northern  Alaska,  and  eastern  Gulf  of  Mexico  to  explora-
tion  (Broder  2010).  Following  the  oil  spill,  however,  the 
administration suspended new deepwater drilling activity in 
the GoM and Alaska and canceled a lease sale off the coast 
of Virginia (Straub 2010). The Reversing President Obama’s 
Offshore Moratorium Act, which passed in the House, and 
the Offshore Production and Safety Act of 2011, which failed 
to pass in the Senate, would open much larger swaths of the 
OCS than President Obama’s pre-spill plan, areas estimated 
by the Minerals Management Service (now part of the Bureau 
of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement) 
to contain more than 2.5 billion barrels of oil and 7.5 billion 
cubic feet of natural gas (BOEMRE 2006). We adjust offshore 
8. In updating GoM production rates for the 2011 Annual Energy Outlook, 
EIA incorporated (a) the impact of the moratorium and decreased subsequent 
leasing and permitting rates and increased exploration costs and (b) changes 
in discovery rates independent of the oil spill. We were unable to separate 
these two effects and thus include both in this analysis. The resulting estimates 
should therefore be treated as optimistic. 
leasing availability in EIA’s National Energy Modeling System 
accordingly to estimate the bill’s impact.
There  is  considerable  uncertainty  surrounding  reserve 
estimates for parts of the OCS currently closed to exploration 
and production. For an upper-bound estimate of the poten-
tial increases in domestic production from expanded offshore 
access, we have included EIA’s High OCS Resource side case to 
the 2011 Annual Energy Outlook, in which total OCS reserves 
are twice as high as current BOEMRE estimates (EIA 2011a). 
Enhanced Oil Recovery
In  addition  to  drilling  new  wells,  domestic  oil  production 
can be expanded by increasing output from existing wells. 
Enhanced oil recovery techniques allow companies to move 
beyond the 10 to 40 percent recovery rates possible through 
conventional production methods. Most enhanced oil recovery 
is achieved by injecting either steam or gas into the well to 
allow oil to flow more easily to the surface. Carbon dioxide 
(CO2), often used in gas injection, is currently sourced from 
naturally  occurring  reservoirs  or  industrial  facilities.9  Coal-
fired power plants are the largest source of CO2 emissions in 
the United States but are not currently equipped to capture 
that CO2 for enhanced oil recovery use. Cap-and-trade legisla-
tion, like the American Clean Energy and Security Act passed 
in the House of Representatives in 2009 and the American 
Power  Act  introduced  in  the  Senate  in  2010,  creates  an 
economic incentive to either retrofit existing coal-fired power 
plants with carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) equip-
ment or replace them with new CCS-equipped plants.10 EIA 
analysis of the American Power Act forecasts that between 51 
and 105 gigawatts of coal-fired power generation would be 
CCS-equipped by 2035 as a result of the bill and that the CO2 
captured would increase US oil production by between 0.8 
million and 1 million bpd (EIA 2010b). 
Following the 2010 midterm elections, the odds of cap-
and-trade legislation passing the Senate and making it to the 
president’s desk are extremely thin. There continues to be, 
however, bipartisan interest in CCS in Congress (US Senate 
2011). The most ambitious legislative proposal aimed at accel-
erating CCS deployment, and the proposal we chose for anal-
ysis, is the Carbon Capture and Sequestration Deployment 
Act of 2010 cosponsored by Democrat John Rockefeller of 
West Virginia and now-retired Republican George Voinovich 
of Ohio (Rockefeller 2010). The bill would raise $20 billion 
9. See http://fossil.energy.gov/programs/oilgas/eor for a good overview of the 
use of CO2 for enhanced oil recovery. 
10. Both bills created additional incentives for CCS through the provision of 
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for CCS demonstration projects through a small surcharge on 
the sale of electricity generated with fossil fuels, extend $20 
billion in loan guarantees to subsequent CCS-equipped power 
plants and industrial facilities, and provide a tax credit for CO2 
sequestered underground, including that used in enhanced oil 
recovery. All told, the bill aims to prompt the construction or 
retrofit of 82 gigawatts of CCS-equipped power plants inde-
pendent of a cap-and-trade system. 
Heavy Duty Vehicle Standards
In  May  2010,  President  Obama  issued  a  memorandum 
requesting the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and 
the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) 
to develop greenhouse gas and fuel economy standards for 
heavy duty vehicles (HDVs), under the authority of the Clean 
Air Act and the Energy Independence and Security Act of 
2007. In November of that year, EPA and NHTSA (2010a) 
released their proposed rule, which covers model years 2014 
through 2017. While the president’s memorandum called for 
the final rule to be issued by July 30, 2011, EPA and NHTSA 
did not deliver the rule to the White House for review until 
June 2, 2011. As a result, EPA and NHTSA do not expect the 
final rule to be issued until September 30, 2011.
EIA modeled the impacts of the proposed HDV rule as 
a side case to the 2011 Annual Energy Outlook (EIA 2011a). 
As the final rule was not available in time for inclusion in this 
policy brief, we have adopted EIA’s approach and assumptions.
Extended Light Duty Vehicle Standards
In  the  same  May  2010  memorandum,  President  Obama 
called on EPA and NHTSA to begin work on extending the 
2012 to 2016 greenhouse gas and fuel economy standards for 
light duty vehicles (LDVs) released the month earlier through 
model year 2025. Responding to the president’s request, EPA 
and NHTSA (2010b) issued a notice of intent outlining the 
two  agencies’  plans  for  the  rulemaking  on  September  30, 
2010. They also released an Interim Joint Technical Assessment 
Report, which indicated the agencies would be exploring an 
average  annual  increase  in  corporate  average  fuel  economy 
(CAFE) standards of between 3 and 6 percent for model years 
2017 through 2025 (EPA and NHTSA 2010c).
As with the proposed HDV rule, EIA modeled the impacts 
of a potential 2017–25 LDV rule as a side case to the 2011 
Annual Energy Outlook (EIA 2011a). EIA explored the impact 
of both a 3 and 6 percent annual increase in CAFE standards to 
cover the range of potential outcomes of the final rule. As with 
HDVs, here we have adopted EIA’s approach and assumptions. 
Building Efficiency Improvements
While US oil demand is driven primarily through the trans-
portation sector, 6 percent of petroleum supply is consumed 
in residential and commercial buildings (EIA 2010a). Citing 
the potential security benefits of energy savings in buildings, 
President Obama announced the Better Buildings Initiative in 
February 2011 (White House 2011a). The initiative seeks a 20 
percent improvement in the energy efficiency of the country’s 
commercial building stock by 2020 through tax incentives, 
low-cost financing, worker training, and innovation prizes. 
This level of efficiency improvement is achievable with 
current technology and at low or negative cost (Houser 2009). 
It is noneconomic barriers, such as a lack of information and 
principal-agent problems, that pose the greatest challenge to 
building efficiency improvement efforts. While it is impossible 
to assess based on current information the potential effective-
ness of the Better Buildings Initiative in overcoming these 
barriers, we include it in our analysis with the assumption that 
the 2020 target is met, to illustrate the ways in which building 
efficiency improvements impact US energy security relative to 
other policy options. 
Advanced Biofuels Development
Noticeably  absent  from  the  current  energy  security  debate 
are proposals to accelerate the development and deployment 
of  biofuels.  There  are  two  reasons  for  this.  First,  existing 
policy support for biofuels is quite strong. The Renewable 
Fuels  Standard  (RFS),  enacted  through  the  Energy  Policy 
Act of 2005 (GPO 2005) and strengthened in the Energy 
Independence and Security Act of 2007 (GPO 2007), requires 
36 billion gallons of biofuels be blended into the domestic 
transportation fuel mix each year by 2022.11 Of this 36 billion 
gallon mandate, only 15 billion can be met through conven-
tional biofuels such as corn ethanol. Of the remaining 21 
billion gallons, 16 billion must come from cellulosic ethanol 
and 5 billion from noncellulosic advanced biofuels, including 
biodiesel. 
While conventional and noncellulosic advanced biofuels 
production has kept pace with the RFS mandate, industry’s 
ability to develop and produce cellulosic ethanol has lagged 
behind the aggressive targets set out in the RFS. As a result, 
EPA has been forced to issue waivers for the cellulosic mandate 
(as allowed for in legislation). For 2011, EPA adjusted down 
the cellulosic ethanol target from 250 million gallons to 6.6 
million gallons (EPA 2010). In its 2011 Annual Energy Outlook, 
11. For more information on the RFS, see www.epa.gov/otaq/fuels/renewable-
fuels/index.htm.N u m b e r   Pb1 1 - 1 0   Ju Ne  2 0 1 1
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EIA projects that the United States will be able to achieve only 
26 billion of the 36 billion gallon RFS mandate in 2022 due to 
cellulosic ethanol production constraints (EIA 2011a).
Second,  as  congressional  attention  has  focused  on 
reducing the country’s budget deficit, taxpayer support for 
biofuels production are increasingly under attack. On June 
16, 2011, the Senate voted to repeal the volumetric ethanol 
excise tax credit (VEETC) and ethanol import tariff (E&E 
News  2011)  when  just  months  before  the  incentives  had 
been extended as part of the December 2010 compromise tax 
package (E&E News 2010). Going even further, some Senate 
Republicans are now looking to block federal funding for flex-
fuel vehicles and ethanol infrastructure. 
The one area where both the administration and members 
of Congress are looking to increase biofuels policy support, 
rather than scale it back, is advanced research and develop-
ment. In its Blueprint for a Secure Energy Future released in 
March 2011, the White House calls for the construction of 
four cellulosic ethanol biorefineries over the next two years 
and greater military procurement of advanced biofuels to help 
drive down cost (White House 2011c). As an upper-bound 
estimate  of  what  a  concerted  biofuels  R&D  effort  could 
deliver, we analyze the energy security impact of an increase 
in cellulosic ethanol availability sufficient to achieve existing 
RFS targets. 
Natural Gas Vehicle Deployment
Rapid development of unconventional natural gas resources 
such as shale gas in recent years has dramatically altered the 
domestic US energy landscape and significantly reduced the 
current and projected cost of natural gas. EIA’s 2009 Annual 
Energy Outlook forecast domestic natural gas production of 
19.7 trillion cubic feet and natural gas spot prices of $7.71 per 
million British thermal units (BTU) in 2020 (EIA 2009). Two 
years later, EIA revised up its 2020 natural gas production 
forecast by 20 percent and reduced its price forecast by 35 
percent (EIA 2011a).12 The gap between US oil and natural 
gas prices has reached historic levels, prompting both poli-
cymakers and industry leaders to explore options for using 
natural gas as an oil substitute in the transportation system.13 
Most legislative proposals have focused on incentivizing 
the use of compressed or liquefied natural gas in heavy duty 
fleet vehicles such as long-haul trucks. We selected the New 
Alternative Transportation to Give Americans Solutions Act 
12. Prices are in real 2009 dollars. 
13. See, for example, the Pickens Plan advocated by oil man T. Boone Pickens, 
www.pickensplan.com/theplan.
of 2011 (known as the NAT GAS Act) for analysis as it is 
currently the most advanced of the various legislative proposals 
pertaining to the use of natural gas for transportation, with 
186 cosponsors in the House as of June 2011 (GPO 2011d). 
The bill increases and extends tax credits for the manufacture, 
purchase,  and  operation  of  natural  gas–powered  vehicles, 
conversion of conventional vehicles into natural gas vehicles, 
and installation of natural gas fueling stations. 
Estimating the number of existing heavy duty vehicles 
that will take advantage of the tax credits made available under 
the bill for conversion to natural gas is challenging. As a result, 
we decided to analyze two natural gas vehicle scenarios: one 
where no conversion takes place and where we adopt EIA’s 
assumptions about vehicle preference and supply constraints 
and  the  other  where  10  percent  of  existing  vehicles  are 
converted by 2017 when the tax credit expires and where we 
loosen vehicle preference and supply constraint assumptions. 
This should provide reasonable upper and lower bounds on 
the legislation’s potential impact.
Electric Vehicle Deployment
In  addition  to  replacing  oil  as  a  transportation  fuel  with 
natural gas or biofuels, there is growing interest both in the 
White House and Congress to reduce American oil consump-
tion  through  the  development  and  deployment  of  electric 
vehicles. In his 2011 State of the Union Address, President 
Obama set a goal of 1 million electric vehicles on US roads by 
2015 (White House 2011b). The administration has invested 
heavily in electric vehicle R&D and extended loan guaran-
tees to advanced battery manufacturers. A number of electric 
vehicle bills have been introduced in Congress in recent years, 
but  most  are  focused  exclusively  on  near-term  R&D  and 
deployment. 
In the interest of selecting an electric vehicle proposal 
of  comparable  time  horizon  to  the  vehicle  efficiency  and 
natural gas vehicle proposals included in this policy brief, we 
analyze the Electrification Coalition’s Electrification Roadmap 
(Electrification  Coalition  2009).  The  roadmap  calls  for 
increasing and extending current tax credits for the purchase 
of electric vehicles through 2018, for loan guarantees for elec-
tric vehicle manufacturers, and for new tax credits for public 
charging stations and electrical grid infrastructure.
There  is  considerable  uncertainty  about  both  future 
battery  cost  and  consumer  acceptance  of  electric  vehicles. 
As with natural gas vehicles, we address this uncertainty by 
analyzing two scenarios that represent our view of the upper 
and lower bounds for potential deployment. In the lower-
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battery cost and consumer attitudes, assumptions that under 
current  policy  result  in  only  400,000  plug-in  electric  and 
fully electric vehicles on the road by 2015—well below the 
president’s target and only 2 percent of the total vehicle stock 
by 2035 (EIA 2011a). For the upper-bound scenario, we use 
battery cost assumptions from Argonne National Laboratory’s 
battery  cost  model,  which  were  incorporated  in  the  EPA’s 
notice of intent for the 2017–25 light duty vehicle efficiency 
rulemakings  (EPA  and  NHTSA  2010b)  and  which  are 
considerably more optimistic than EIA’s assumptions. We also 
change the consumer preference parameters so that prospec-
tive buyers are just as likely to purchase an electric vehicle as 
a conventional vehicle of comparable size, performance, and 
life-cycle cost.
Carbon Tax
While cap-and-trade legislation in the United States appears 
to be dead and buried, there is renewed interest in a carbon 
tax, largely as a result of its revenue-raising potential. For its 
2011 fiscal summit, the Peter G. Peterson Foundation (2011) 
invited six think tanks from across the political spectrum to 
submit “comprehensive plans” to meet America’s budget chal-
lenges. Four of the six recommended a carbon tax, including 
the  conservative  American  Enterprise  Institute  (AEI).  AEI 
recommends a carbon tax starting in 2013, reaching $26 per 
ton of CO2 equivalent in 2017 and increasing at 5.6 percent 
per year thereafter. While not intended as an energy security 
proposal per se, we analyze the impact of the AEI carbon tax 
proposal on US oil production and consumption.
scoPe And methodology
As mentioned in the introduction, we compare the potential 
impact of the above proposals, both individually and in combi-
nation, on US energy security to provide the policy community 
and public more broadly with a better sense of what current 
proposals can realistically achieve. While all sources of energy 
come with some security concerns, we focus primarily on oil, 
as it is the focus of current policy proposals. In a few cases, 
policies aimed at increasing US oil security create new energy 
security concerns, which we highlight and discuss. For our 
analysis we employ RHG-NEMS, a version of EIA’s National 
Energy Modeling System (NEMS) maintained and operated 
by the Rhodium Group in New York.14 EIA uses NEMS for 
its Annual Energy Outlook as well as to analyze specific energy 
14. More information on RHG-NEMS is available at www.rhgroup.net/
energysecurity. 
and environmental legislation when asked to do so by the US 
Congress.15 While it has its limitations, NEMS is the most 
detailed model of the US energy sector currently available. It 
also has the benefit of being a completely open source, so the 
technology and market assumptions developed by EIA staff  
are subject to close scrutiny by market participants and the 
policy community. The resulting input helps EIA to continue 
improving the model. 
All proposals are measured against the reference case in 
the 2011 Annual Energy Outlook (EIA 2011a). It is impor-
tant to note that this is just one scenario for how US energy 
markets will evolve. This approach is useful for evaluating the 
relative impact of a specific policy or group of policies. But as 
with all forecasts, any estimates of the absolute value of US 
oil imports, gasoline prices, or energy expenditures, particu-
larly in the out-years, should be taken with a grain of salt. 
Relatively small unforeseen changes in the US economy or 
global energy markets can have a significant impact on what 
US energy needs look like in the years ahead. 
We  adopt  the  technology  and  market  assumptions  in 
the 2011 Annual Energy Outlook, except in two cases. In our 
upper-bound  estimates  for  Increased  Offshore  Access,  we 
adopt  the  recoverable  oil  reserve  estimates  from  the  2011 
Annual Energy Outlook’s High OCS Resource side case. In 
the upper-bound estimates for Electric Vehicle Deployment 
we use Argonne National Laboratory’s battery cost forecasts. 
In both cases, the impact of the policy proposals is measured 
against a baseline where those specific assumptions are also 
modified.16 NEMS’ ability to accurately assess the impact of 
current policy proposals falls short in two areas of particular 
relevance to our analysis. First, the international oil market 
response to any change in US oil production or consumption 
is extremely hard to forecast. OPEC could choose to coun-
teract a price decline resulting from increased US production 
or reduced US demand by curbing output, which could offset 
any price gains reported in the model. Even in the absence 
of any OPEC reaction to changes in America’s oil supply/
demand balance, price changes depend on marginal produc-
tion costs around the world, which are unclear and constantly 
changing. As a result, any of our estimates of the impact of 
individual  policy  proposals  on  global  oil  prices  should  be 
taken with caution. Second, as mentioned previously, rapid 
changes in the unconventional oil production landscape in the 
United States may not be appropriately captured in NEMS. 
While these developments are not the result of policy, they can 
15. Documentation on the NEMS model is available at www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/
aeo/overview.
16. A more detailed discussion of our methodology is available at www.
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change a given policy’s impact on US oil supply and demand. 
In discussing our findings, we highlight areas where an upside 
surprise  in  US  unconventional  oil  production,  tight  oil  in 
particular, could significantly change a policy’s impact. 
To score each policy using the US Chamber of Commerce’s 
Index  of  Energy  Security  Risk  we  adopt  the  methodology 
developed by Michael Levi and Trevor Houser to assess the 
2010 American Power Act”17 
We do not, in this brief, assess the cost-effectiveness of 
current proposals or their aggregate impact on US consumers 
or the federal budget. Recent studies, such as the National 
Energy Policy Institute and Resources for the Future report 
Toward a New National Energy Policy (Krupnick et al. 2010), 
provide a good assessment of the relative cost effectiveness of 
different types of energy security policies, though none analyze 
the specific proposals addressed here.
WhAt current ProPosAls delIver
The  energy  security  proposals  analyzed  in  this  policy  brief 
fall  into  three  categories:  those  that  increase  domestic  oil 
production, those that improve energy efficiency, and those 
that promote fuel substitution, with the exception of a carbon 
tax, which does all three. Each approach shapes US energy 
security in different ways. We summarize our findings below.18 
We separate our discussion of policy impacts into near-term 
(2011–15), medium-term (2016–20) and long-term (2021–
35) effects.
Increased Production
Of the three policies aimed at increasing domestic oil produc-
tion, Accelerating GoM Leasing and Permitting has the most 
significant  near-term  impact,  increasing  domestic  output 
by 202,000 bpd on average between 2011 and 2035 (figure 
9).  Over  the  longer  term,  Increasing  Offshore  Access  has 
the  potential  to  do  more—up  to  a  613,000  bpd  increase 
in  average  annual  domestic  production  between  2021  and 
2035 if higher-end reserve estimates turn out to be correct. A 
significant increase in onshore unconventional oil production 
not currently forecast in the reference case would likely erode 
some of these offshore gains as the resulting lower prices would 
make marginal offshore oil projects uneconomic. While not 
quite as significant, Enhanced Oil Recovery increases produc-
17. A full description of that methodology is available at www.slate.com/
id/2257021.
18. More detailed results are available at www.rhgroup.net/energysecurity.
tion by a healthy 97,000 bpd on average between 2011 and 
2035 (figure 9).19 
On balance, increased US production reduces the severity 
of future oil supply disruption because it decreases more polit-
ically volatile producers’ share of global oil supply. In other 
words,  if  increasing  the  US  share  of  global  oil  production 
reduces the Iranian share of global production (even if Iranian 
production grows in absolute terms), then all else equal the 
increase in global oil prices resulting from a disruption in 
Iranian supply will be lower as well. 
Increased US production also results in a modest decrease 
in global oil prices over the long term. Crude is $0.55 per 
barrel cheaper than the reference case between 2011 and 2035 
in the Accelerating GoM Leasing and Permitting scenario and 
up to $1.04 cheaper in the Increased Offshore Access case 
(figure 10). This translates into a 0.5 and 3 cent reduction 
in gasoline prices, respectively. Net US imports decline by as 
much as 166,000 bpd between 2011 and 2035 (Accelerating 
GoM Leasing and Permitting) (figure 11) and as much as 
578,000  bpd  between  2021  and  2035  (Increased  Offshore 
Access with high resource assumptions). The combination of 
lower quantities imported and lower global oil prices reduces 
US expenditures on imported oil by up to $5.6 billion a year 
between 2011 and 2035 (figure 12). 
Lower oil prices also increase US oil demand, albeit very 
slightly (figure 13). This offsets some of the reductions in total 
US oil expenditures (figure 14). It also increases the economic 
impact of an oil price spike of a given magnitude (i.e., the 
impact on GDP of a $10 per barrel price spike is greater the 
more oil dependent the US economy becomes). As US oil 
expenditure gains under these policy scenarios occur only if oil 
prices decline, they are more vulnerable to reactionary OPEC 
production  cuts  than  expenditure  gains  achieved  through 
improved efficiency or fuel substitution. 
In contrast with longer-term efficiency and fuel substi-
tution policies, however, increased domestic production can 
play a critical role in alleviating near-term global oil supply 
19. In our analysis the Carbon Capture and Sequestration Deployment Act of 
2010, our Enhanced Oil Recovery policy, results in 52 gigawatts of additional 
CCS capacity between 2011 and 2035. 
Of the three policies aimed at increasing 
domestic oil production, Accelerating Gulf 
of Mexico Leasing and Permitting has the 
most significant near-term impact….N u m b e r   Pb1 1 - 1 0   Ju Ne  2 0 1 1
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constraints. IEA predicts global supplies will stay tight through 
2015, which increases the risk of further oil price spikes. Our 
Accelerating  GoM  Leasing  and  Permitting  scenario  would 
increase US oil production by up to 300,000 bpd during that 
period, which could have a meaningful near-term impact on 
global oil markets. 
Improved Efficiency
Of the three efficiency scenarios, only one has a meaningful 
impact on US oil consumption—Extended Light Duty Vehicle 
Standards. As these standards do not take effect until 2017, it 
is a largely backloaded effect. But it has the most significant 
long-term impact on US oil imports, global oil prices, and US 
oil expenditures of any of the policies we analyze, at least at 
the higher end of the range of potential 2025 vehicle efficiency 
targets. US oil demand is reduced by between 719,000 and 1 
million bpd on average between 2011 and 2035 (figure 13). 
Net imports are reduced by 553,000 to 791,000 bpd (figure 
11) and domestic production falls by 80,000 to 88,000 bpd 
(figure 9) during that period. A drop in domestic biofuels 
supply makes up the rest. Crude oil prices drop by $1.58 to 
$2.33 per barrel (figure 10), which translates into a 6 to 10 
cent decline in gasoline prices. Overall annual oil expenditures 
drop by $55 billion to $78 billion between 2011 and 2035 
(figure 14 and table 1) and US spending on imported oil falls 
by $27 billion to $37 billion (figure 12).
Reducing the oil intensity of the US economy makes it less 
vulnerable to a given price spike (i.e., a $10 per barrel increase 
in oil prices has less impact on the US economy under the 
policy scenario than in the reference case). The decline in expen-
ditures on imported oil both improves the US trade balance 
and reduces revenue to oil-producing states that pursue policies 
counter to American interests. While reactionary OPEC supply 
cuts could erode some of these gains, the reduction in physical 
quantity demanded would ensure the majority of change in 
expenditures, even if prices returned to reference levels. 
The  downside  of  the  Extended  Light  Duty  Vehicle 
Standards scenario is that, all else equal, it likely increases the 
riskiness of the global oil pool. Unless OPEC cuts supply in 
reaction to the policy, the reduction in US demand will most 
likely be met by a reduction in the highest cost sources of 
supply, and at the moment those tend to be located in more 
stable countries (Goldman Sachs 2010b). So while vehicle effi-
ciency makes the US economy more resilient to a $10 increase 
in global oil prices, it may also increase the odds of a given 
supply disruption causing a $10 price increase. Given that our 
Extended Light Duty Vehicle Standards scenario reduces US 
oil and biofuels production only by 165,000 to 214,000 bpd 
between 2011 and 2035 compared with the reference case, we 
believe this effect would be quite small and overwhelmed by 
the economic security benefits of reducing the oil intensity of 
the American economy.
While  the  Extended  Light  Duty  Vehicle  Standards 
scenario does the most to reduce US oil expenditures, the 
Building  Efficiency  Improvements  scenario  curbs  overall 
energy expenditures significantly. Between 2011 and 2035, 
Americans spend $43 billion less on energy (primarily elec-
tricity and natural gas) per year compared with the reference 
scenario, the second highest of the policies we analyze (figure 
15). While this does less to buffer the United States against oil 
price spikes than a commensurate decline in transportation 
sector energy expenditures, the scenario does rank relatively 
well on the US Chamber of Commerce’s Energy Security Risk 
Index (figure 16). 
Fuel Substitution
Broadly  speaking,  oil  demand  in  the  transportation  sector 
can  be  reduced  either  through  improving  efficiency  or  by 
replacing oil with another form of energy. In practice, the 
two approaches are not so distinct. For example, under EPA/
NHTSA vehicle standards electric vehicles have higher effi-
ciency ratings than their conventional light duty vehicle coun-
terparts, and natural gas–powered trucks have lower efficiency 
(but also lower greenhouse gas emissions) than conventional 
heavy  duty  vehicles.  As  a  result  the  Extended  Light  Duty 
Vehicle Standards or Heavy Duty Vehicle Standards change 
the rate of electric or natural gas vehicle deployment. Electric 
and natural gas vehicle deployment is less rapid under these 
policies, however, than under the Electric Vehicle Deployment 
and Natural Gas Vehicle Deployment scenarios.
The impact of the Electric Vehicle Deployment and Natural 
Gas  Vehicle  Deployment  scenarios  on  US  oil  consumption 
Of the three efficiency scenarios, 
only one has a meaningful impact 
on US oil consumption—Extended 
Light Duty Vehicle Standards.
The impact of the Electric Vehicle 
Deployment and Natural Gas Vehicle 
Deployment scenarios on US oil 
consumption depends a great deal on 
assumptions about market acceptance, 
infrastructure constraints, and, in the 
case of electric vehicles, battery cost.N u m b e r   Pb1 1 - 1 0   Ju Ne  2 0 1 1
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depends a great deal on assumptions about market acceptance, 
infrastructure constraints, and, in the case of electric vehicles, 
battery cost. Both policies have a relatively modest impact on 
US oil demand and oil imports in the first decade, as it takes 
time to turn over the vehicle fleet (table 2). But over the long 
term, both policies deliver meaningful reductions (at least when 
compared  with  Heavy  Duty  Vehicle  Standards  or  Building 
Efficiency  Improvements),  prompting  a  modest  decline  in 
global oil prices (figure 10). On average between 2011 and 
2035 annual oil expenditures decline by between $8 billion 
and $28 billion in Electric Vehicle Deployment and by between 
$1 billion and $16 billion in Natural Gas Vehicle Deployment 
(figure 14). US oil imports are reduced by 88,000 to 297,000 
bpd with Electric Vehicle Deployment and 9,000 to 186,000 
bpd with Natural Gas Vehicle Deployment (figure 11). 
While the magnitude is smaller, the way in which these 
changes in US oil consumption impact American energy secu-
rity is similar to the Extended Light Duty Vehicle Standards 
scenario. Electric and natural gas vehicles, whether deployed 
through  vehicle  standards  or  dedicated  policy,  come  with 
additional  energy  security  considerations.  Electric  vehicles 
use rare earth metals and other materials for which there are 
short-term supply chain risks (Department of Energy 2010). 
While the country is currently awash in domestic natural gas, 
a change in the shale gas development outlook or significant 
linkages between the US and international gas markets could 
make natural gas less secure and affordable than it is today. In 
our view, the security risks surrounding electric vehicles are 
lower than natural gas vehicles, but at the levels of deployment 
assessed in this policy brief, both scenarios are lower risk than 
the status quo.
Unlike electric and natural gas vehicles, oil demand reduc-
tions achieved through biofuels deployment are largely addi-
tional to those achieved through vehicle efficiency standards. 
Under our Advanced Biofuels Development scenario, US oil 
demand  is  reduced  by  an  average  of  329,000  bpd  between 
2011 and 2035 (figure 13). Oil prices are $0.90 lower, which 
combined with the demand decrease reduces annual oil expendi-
tures by $24 billion (figure 14). In the case of biofuels, however, 
this does not necessarily make the economy less vulnerable to oil 
price spikes. Since oil and biofuels are near-perfect substitutes, 
their prices are highly correlated. So an international supply 
disruption will push biofuels prices up alongside the price of 
oil. As the advanced biofuels will likely be more expensive than 
gasoline and diesel, overall US energy expenditures will increase. 
When it comes to the US trade balance or revenue to 
foreign oil producers, biofuels’ benefits are a bit clearer. Under 
the Advanced Biofuels Development scenario, US oil imports 
decline by 264,000 bpd on average between 2011 and 2035 
(figure 11). That translates into a $13 billion decline in annual 
imported oil expenditures (figure 12). 
But like electric vehicles and natural gas vehicles, biofuels 
are not without their own security concerns. With food prices 
rising right alongside oil prices in recent years and high food 
costs adding to political instability in some developing coun-
tries, there is growing debate about whether biofuels are an 
effective  security  strategy.  In  addition,  agricultural  markets 
come with their own supply concerns and price shocks, which 
can feed into oil markets at high enough levels of biofuels 
deployment. These are important questions and ones that we 
are actively exploring. But it is a topic far beyond the scope 
of this brief. We will just note that in general the concerns 
surrounding cellulosic ethanol production (the specific policy 
intervention  we  are  analyzing  here)  are  considerably  lower 
than for ethanol derived from corn.
Carbon Tax
The big surprise coming out of this analysis is the impact of a 
carbon tax on US oil production and consumption. Carbon 
taxes  are  generally  considered  second-best  approaches  for 
reducing oil demand as they are primarily designed to reduce 
CO2  emissions.  Not  only  is  oil  less  carbon-intensive  than 
coal  (though  more  carbon-intensive  than  natural  gas)  but 
also oil demand is less elastic. As a result, analysis of carbon 
pricing policies (whether tax or cap-and-trade) shows the most 
significant transformations in the power sector as coal-fired 
power plants are either retrofitted with CCS or shut down 
and  replaced  with  natural  gas  or  renewables  (EIA  2010b). 
In comparison, changes to oil demand in the transportation 
sector are more modest. 
But it turns out that modest changes in the context of 
a  carbon  tax  are  relatively  large  changes  when  compared 
with other proposals currently on the table. Between 2011 
and 2035, a carbon tax at the level proposed by AEI would 
reduce  US  oil  demand  by  652,000  bpd,  higher  than  any 
other proposal except Extended Light Duty Vehicle Standards 
(figure 13). Because a carbon tax reduces demand for all parts 
of the oil barrel, not just gasoline, the change in US oil expen-
ditures is larger per barrel of oil reduced—$64 billion per year 
in total between 2011 and 2035 (figure 14).
The big surprise coming out of this 
analysis is the impact of a carbon tax on 
US oil production and consumption.N u m b e r   Pb1 1 - 1 0   Ju Ne  2 0 1 1
13
Even  more  surprising,  a  carbon  tax  reduces  US  oil 
consumption while simultaneously boosting US oil produc-
tion—a feat no other policy we analyze can claim. Between 
2011 and 2035, average annual domestic oil production is 
167,000 bpd higher, on par with what the policies focused 
specifically on increasing supply deliver (figure 9). Most of this 
increase comes in the form of natural gas liquids, a byproduct 
of natural gas production that serves as an oil substitute in 
certain industrial applications and is thus generally classified 
under “oil production.” More natural gas demand for power 
generation in the face of a carbon price means more domestic 
gas production, which means more natural gas liquids. The 
rest  of  the  production  increase  comes  from  enhanced  oil 
recovery using CO2 captured from coal-fired power plants. 
Taken together, the decline in consumption and increase 
in production resulting from a carbon tax shaves 663,000 bpd, 
or $32 billion per year, off the US oil import bill between 
2011 and 2035 (figures 11 and 12). This helps the carbon 
tax score significantly higher than any of the other policies 
we analyzed using the US Chamber of Commerce’s energy 
security risk index (figure 16).
The downside of a carbon tax is that while it reduces the 
cost of oil for the American economy, it raises the average 
cost  of  energy  for  the  American  consumer.  Between  2011 
and 2035, a carbon tax would raise overall annual US energy 
expenditures by $147 billion (figure 15). The vast majority of 
this would be a fiscal transfer, rather than an economic cost. 
That money could be given back to energy consumers or used 
to reduce the federal deficit (or some balance of both). AEI’s 
carbon tax proposal specifically would raise upto $195 billion 
per year on average between 2011 and 2035. If completely 
dedicated  to  improving  the  federal  government’s  balance 
sheet, the carbon tax alone would reduce the deficit by up to 
20 percent over the next decade (CBO 2011). 
All Together Now
Individually,  the  policies  assessed  in  this  brief  would  have 
only a modest impact on US oil imports or US oil expen-
ditures, with the exception of Accelerated GoM Leasing and 
Permitting in the short term and the Extended Light Duty 
Vehicle Standards and Carbon Tax scenarios in the long term, 
where the effect is more significant. But what about an “all 
of the above” strategy where the ten policies we analyze are 
combined? We model the policies’ collective impact both in 
the base case and with the more liberal OCS resource, natural 
gas and electric vehicle penetration, and battery cost assump-
tions used in the upper-bound scenarios of the various indi-
vidual policies. The analysis is integrated so the interaction 
between various policies is captured. 
Taken together, these various individual proposals have a 
meaningful impact on US oil production and consumption. 
In addition to the near-term supply relief from increased GoM 
production, total domestic oil output increases by roughly 1 
million bpd, about 10 to 12 percent, between 2021 and 2035. 
Oil demand is reduced by 2.2 million to 2.8 million bpd during 
that period, or 12 to 15 percent. Together, increased domestic 
supply, efficiency, and fuel substitution curb US oil imports by 
3.1 million to 3.8 million bpd by 2035. In the upper-bound 
(high) scenario, this would cut overall net US oil imports to 
4  million  bpd,  reducing  US  dependence  on  imported  oil 
(measured in physical terms) to its lowest point in the past 40 
years (figure 17). America’s annual imported oil bill would fall 
by between $127 billion and $148 billion between 2021 and 
2035, taking a significant bite out of the country’s trade deficit. 
Because global oil prices drop by $8 to $10 per barrel, foreign 
oil producer revenue could be reduced by up to half a trillion 
dollars per year in the long term.
It  is  important,  however,  not  to  overstate  either  the 
economic or national security benefits such a transformation 
would produce. For example, while half a trillion dollars lower 
than in the reference case, foreign oil producer revenue still 
grows by over a trillion dollars per year in absolute real terms 
between 2011 and 2035. While oil expenditures as a share of 
GDP return to late 1990s levels towards the end of our projec-
tion  period  (figure  18),  the  US  economy  will  still  remain 
vulnerable to international oil market disruptions, particularly 
in the short and medium term. So while a domestic energy 
policy  agenda  that  combines  increased  domestic  supply, 
improved  efficiency,  and  development  of  oil  substitutes  is 
crucial, it is not a sufficient energy security strategy. 
WhAt’s mIssIng from the PolIcy debAte
As the United States will remain dependent on international 
oil supply for the foreseeable future and will continue to be 
economically  vulnerable  to  global  oil  shocks,  Washington 
needs a strategy for reducing the likelihood of those shocks and 
mitigating their economic impact. There is an active debate 
about the role financial investment in oil futures markets may 
have played in recent oil price volatility. This is an important 
question and one that we study closely. But as with the food 
versus  fuel  debate,  it  is  a  complicated  subject  that  cannot 
be  adequately  addressed  within  the  scope  of  this  brief.20 
Improving the stability and reliability of global oil markets 
goes far beyond futures market regulation. The following areas 
20. For a good overview discussion of the way financial investment in oil mar-
kets does and does not impact energy security, see Improving Energy Market 
Regulation: Domestic and International Issues, CGS/IIGG Working Paper, 
February 2011, available at www.cfr.org.N u m b e r   Pb1 1 - 1 0   Ju Ne  2 0 1 1
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deserve particular focus. None of these suggestions are partic-
ularly new; they can be found in the policy recommendations 
section of most serious energy security reports. But they have 
yet to get the attention and emphasis they deserve. 
Better Information
Given  how  central  it  is  to  the  performance  of  the  global 
economy,  the  quality  of  information  about  the  global  oil 
market is surprisingly poor. Lack of inventory and produc-
tion data creates market uncertainty and increases short-term 
volatility. The United States is the only country that provides 
regular,  detailed,  and  reliable  oil  data  and  EIA’s  Weekly 
Petroleum Status Report (the publication through which it is 
first released) is the single most important piece of informa-
tion in the market. Other OECD members report oil data on 
a monthly basis to IEA, but there is a 40 to 50 day lag between 
the end of the reporting month and when the information is 
available to the market. The availability and quality of devel-
oping-country demand and inventory data are even worse. On 
the producer side, the picture is equally murky. Lack of clarity 
about OPEC output levels in particular drives market vola-
tility. Following a particularly chaotic OPEC meeting in June 
2011, Secretary General Abdalla Salem el-Badri complained 
that even among OPEC producers “everyone has his own data 
and information” (Blair 2011).
Realizing  the  importance  of  transparent  and  reliable 
oil statistics, ministers gathered at the International Energy 
Forum in 2002 launched the Joint Oil Data Initiative (JODI). 
The  effort  has  made  important  progress  in  improving  the 
quality and timeliness of global oil-market data but consid-
erable work remains. Of the 98 countries providing data to 
JODI during the second half of 2010, only 55 did so in a 
timely manner and only 67 met JODI’s minimum standard of 
completeness (JODI 2010).
Improving the quality of short-term market information 
will also help support better medium- and long-term plan-
ning. The oil price increases of the past decade were caused 
primarily by the failure of the market to accurately forecast 
developing-country  demand  and  build  enough  production 
capacity to meet that demand at a reasonable price. EIA and 
IEA do terrific work helping market participants and poli-
cymakers plan for the future, but their greatest expertise lies 
in forecasting OECD supply and demand. It is in America’s 
interest  to  support  the  development  of  similar  analytical 
expertise  within  developing  countries,  China  in  particular, 
and to encourage greater collaboration between developed- 
and developing-country forecasters in assessing possible oil-
market futures.
At the international level, policy is moving in the right 
direction but moving too slowly. Multilateral forums like IEA, 
the International Energy Forum, and the G-20 all have oil-
market transparency squarely on the agenda. EIA has stepped 
up its bilateral engagement, working with China’s National 
Energy  Administration  to  improve  the  quality  of  Chinese 
energy statistics and forecasting. But US national policy has 
shifted into reverse. In the face of rising oil prices, MENA 
instability  and  oil-market  uncertainty,  Congress  and  the 
White House opted to cut EIA’s budget by 14 percent (EIA 
2011b). In exchange for a meager $15 million in savings, or 
0.004 percent of the US federal budget, the oil market will 
now either lose the following or see the quality of output 
significantly reduced:
1.  updated estimates of US oil and gas reserves,
2.  analysis of linkages between financial trading and physical 
energy markets,
3.  refinery outage reporting and analysis, 
4.  oil and gas company financial analysis,
5.  improvements to NEMS, the model used to forecast US 
energy supply and demand,
6.  all international energy statistics, and
7.  the International Energy Outlook, one of only two credible 
independent global energy supply and demand forecasts 
currently available.
Funding both EIA and IEA each year costs Americans less 
than they spend on petroleum each hour. If the information 
these two organizations produce is successful in reducing oil 
prices by just 1 percent over a 12-month period, US taxpayers 
earn a 600 percent return on their investment. While we are 
not assessing the relative cost effectiveness of various energy 
security  policy  options  in  this  brief,  it  is  safe  to  say  that 
funding these two organizations wins hands down. 
Stockpile Coordination
IEA was founded in response to the 1973–74 oil price spikes to 
coordinate the response of the major oil-consuming countries 
to future supply disruptions. IEA members agree to maintain 
90 days worth of imported oil in inventories (either strategic 
petroleum reserves [SPRs] or corporate inventories) and coor-
dinate the release of those inventories in the event of an oil 
supply  disruption  (IEA  2011a).  Such  coordination  spreads 
the  cost  of  and  improves  the  effectiveness  of  a  consumer-
country inventory release. This is the case with the SPR release N u m b e r   Pb1 1 - 1 0   Ju Ne  2 0 1 1
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announced on June 23, 2011. Other IEA members will sell 30 
million barrels of oil from strategic inventories in addition to 
the 30 million barrels provided by the United States. 
Large developing-country oil consumers are in the process 
of building their SPRs. This can be a positive development for 
US energy security if it is done transparently in coordination 
with other oil consumers. IEA estimates that filling China 
and India’s new SPRs will add an average of 240,000 bpd to 
global oil demand over the next five years (IEA 2011b). Yet 
official information from Beijing and Delhi as to the exact 
schedule  for  these  inventory  fills  has  been  sparse,  creating 
unneeded market uncertainty. And as China and India are not 
IEA members, no mechanism currently exists to coordinate 
SPR releases in the event of a significant supply disruption. 
While IEA has stated that China and India were consulted 
prior to the June 23 announcement, there is no indication that 
either country will be joining the effort, opting to free ride on 
the resulting oil price reductions instead. Enlisting Chinese 
and Indian cooperation in SPR management will only grow 
in importance in the years ahead if OPEC’s ability to rapidly 
increase supply remains limited, as many analysts currently 
expect (McNally and Levi 2011). 
The June 23 SPR release, only the third in IEA’s history, 
also  opens  the  door  to  a  new  form  of  strategic  inventory 
management—one where oil is released to smooth oil price 
fluctuations, even if they are not caused by significant supply 
disruptions. The White House and IEA have both pointed to 
the disruption of Libyan supply as a principal reason for the 
inventory  release.  Yet  Libyan  oil  was  taken  offline  months 
before the announcement and is not projected to resume until 
well into 2012 if not 2013. A more important driver of the deci-
sion was likely concern that global supplies will tighten during 
the third quarter of 2011, increasing prices at a time when the 
economic recovery is still fragile. There is a compelling case to 
be made for this type of preemptive action, but it is a sharp 
departure from past practice and changes oil-market dynamics 
in important ways. Consuming countries need to have a public 
discussion about whether this is the right way to manage SPRs 
going forward so those investing in future oil production know 
what to expect. 
Producer Engagement
Smart engagement with developing-country consumers can 
improve  the  market’s  ability  to  adequately  plan  for  future 
demand and improve global SPR management. Smart engage-
ment with foreign oil producers can improve the reliability 
and affordability of future oil supply. In recent years, OPEC 
has had increasing difficulty functioning effectively as a cartel. 
Only a handful of producers—Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the 
United Arab Emirates—hold the spare capacity required to 
perform basic cartel functions. That means that other OPEC 
members have little to gain from any increase in aggregate 
cartel production. Raising OPEC production quotas reduces 
oil prices. For Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab 
Emirates, lower prices are offset by higher output. But for 
Iran, Venezuela, and the others, there is only downside to such 
a move. This disparity was a principal reason for the break-
down of the June 2011 OPEC meeting.
Fortunately for global oil markets, the OPEC countries that 
do hold spare capacity are the ones more concerned that high 
oil prices will hurt the global economy—and thus long-term 
oil demand. This creates a window of opportunity for engaging 
these producers in serious dialogue about improving market 
information,  demand  forecasting,  and  management  of  both 
consumers’ strategic inventories and producer’s spare capacity. 
Such a dialogue has begun through the International Energy 
Forum and should be elevated within the G-20, which accounts 
for 80 percent of global oil demand and over half of global oil 
production (including 4 of the 5 largest oil producers—Russia, 
Saudi Arabia, the United States, and China).
Policy Reform
As mentioned earlier, oil prices swing wildly because in the 
short term both supply and demand are inelastic. Some of 
this inelasticity is inherent in the way oil is produced and 
consumed, but some of it is the artifact of policy. Subsidized 
gasoline  and  diesel  prices  decrease  elasticity  in  developing 
countries, increase global oil prices, and ration demand away 
from developed countries. Tax policy in some producer coun-
tries, such as Russia, decreases supply elasticity by removing 
the incentive for companies to increase production in response 
to  higher  prices.  Overall,  policy  uncertainty  in  developed 
countries  hampers  the  development  of  new  sources  of  oil 
supply or fuel and vehicle alternatives, which would increase 
both supply and demand elasticity.
International  collaboration  on  energy  policy  in  general 
has expanded in recent years through the International Energy 
Forum, the Clean Energy Ministerial, the Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) forum, IEA, G-20, and other forums. A 
greater focus on policies that reduce the global economy’s vulner-
ability to oil shocks, and investment in international collabora-
tion that helps advance those policies, will yield energy security 
dividends for the United States. Making significant progress on 
fossil fuel subsidies at the international level will require willing-
ness to reform fossil fuel subsidies at home, including tax credits 
currently provided to US oil companies. N u m b e r   Pb1 1 - 1 0   Ju Ne  2 0 1 1
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Technical Cooperation
Likewise, international cooperation that accelerates the devel-
opment and deployment of oil-producing or oil-saving tech-
nologies is well worth the investment for the United States. 
Chinese companies are looking to replicate the US shale gas 
revolution at home, with the support of the US government. 
To the extent that this enables future Chinese fuel-switching 
from oil to gas, it will deliver gasoline price reductions in the 
United States. Similar technical cooperation on shale oil could 
have an even larger effect. Likewise, international coopera-
tion on advanced battery research, such as that taking place 
through the new US-China Clean Energy Research Center, 
could  make  the  difference  between  whether  the  domestic 
electric vehicle incentives analyzed in this brief result in the 
upper- or lower-bound estimates. 
As with public energy market analysis work, only a sliver 
of the federal budget goes to international energy policy and 
technology cooperation. Yet the pot of money from which 
most of that funding comes was cut by one-third in fiscal year 
2011 relative to fiscal year 2010. Public dollars spent to help 
reduce international oil demand or increase international oil 
supply make even more sense in a fiscally constrained environ-
ment given the potential US economic benefits and should be 
expanded rather than reduced in the years ahead. 
Security Burden-Sharing
US energy security will continue to rest on the safety of oil-
producing assets abroad and the security of global shipping 
lanes. But the cost of providing that safety and security does 
not need to fall on US taxpayers alone. Other oil-consuming 
countries  have  had  the  luxury  of  free  riding  US  military 
spending that helps ensure tankers can move safely from port 
to port. But given US fiscal constraints, this may need to 
change going forward. Enlisting Chinese and Indian support 
in safeguarding critical sea-lanes of control can help lay the 
groundwork  for  broader  security  cost  sharing  in  the  years 
ahead. This is an extremely daunting undertaking but one that 
will be necessary over the long term and is deserving of greater 
focus today. 
And  as  developing  counties  build  out  new  oil  supply 
infrastructure, it is in America’s interest to help them do so 
in the securest way possible. In today’s global oil market, a 
pipeline disruption between Kazakhstan and China can have 
the same impact on US oil prices as a hurricane in the Gulf 
of Mexico. As non-OPEC production gets pushed into higher 
cost and higher risk geographies and geologies, infrastructure 
security concerns will only grow.
Preparing for Success
A significant reduction in US oil imports, whether delivered 
through policy or market forces, will alter the global security 
environment in important ways. Less revenue to oil-producing 
states will help alleviate some security concerns (e.g., funding 
for Iran’s nuclear program) but introduce others (e.g., potential 
political instability in oil-producing states). With developing 
countries responsible for a growing share of that revenue, the 
geopolitical landscape is sure to evolve (Verrastro et al. 2010). 
Preparing for the impact of a reduction in US oil dependence 
will be just as important as putting in place the policies that 
deliver that reduction in the years ahead.
conclusIon
While $4 per gallon gasoline has Washington scrambling for 
quick fix domestic energy policy solutions, there are no silver 
bullets, particularly in the near term. Even over the long term, 
any  individual  policy  approach,  whether  improved  vehicle 
efficiency or expanded offshore drilling, will have only limited 
effect on US oil imports and vulnerability to global oil market 
disruptions. President Obama’s Blueprint for a Secure Energy 
Future includes a range of efficiency and oil substitution poli-
cies—from new light duty vehicle standards to electric vehicle 
incentives  to  advanced  biofuels  R&D.  If  the  administra-
tion’s biofuels push is successful enough to allow the existing 
Renewable Fuels Standard to be achieved (something we are 
skeptical about), then the policies laid out in the blueprint will 
be successful in achieving its goal of a 33 percent reduction in 
US oil imports between 2008 and 2025.21
What the blueprint is missing is a strategy for expanding 
domestic oil production, particularly in the near term when 
it could help head off price spikes resulting from constrained 
global supply.   This has been the primary focus of congres-
sional Republicans, but as shown in our analysis and summa-
rized in figure 19, policy-driven domestic production alone 
(as opposed to that which will occur based on market forces 
alone) will be insufficient to significantly alter the country’s 
energy future. An “all of the above” strategy is required, which 
combines increased domestic production (important in the 
near  term)  with  long-term  investments  in  energy-efficient 
vehicles  and  oil  alternatives,  whether  electric,  natural  gas, 
or biofuels. A carbon tax, while still a long shot politically, 
would deliver further energy security gains and help reduce 
the deficit in the process. 
21. Most of these gains will be achieved as a result of market forces or past 
policy initiatives. For more discussion, see President Obama's Energy Security 
Blueprint, April 21, 2011, www.rhgroup.net. N u m b e r   Pb1 1 - 1 0   Ju Ne  2 0 1 1
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But even the most comprehensive package of domestic 
energy  policy  solutions  will  not  meet  the  country’s  energy 
security  challenge.  A  true  “all  of  the  above”  strategy  must 
include a concerted effort to improve the transparency and 
reliability of global oil markets, on which the United States 
will continue to depend for decades to come. The administra-
tion has made important steps forward through international 
forums like the G-20, the International Energy Forum, IEA, 
and the Clean Energy Ministerial, but much more needs to 
be done. Both the White House and Congress have dealt a 
serious blow to American energy security by cutting funding 
for EIA. This funding cut should be reversed and international 
energy engagement significantly expanded in the years ahead. 
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Figure 1     Energy intensity of the US economy, 1900–2010








BTU = British thermal units
Sources: EIA (2010a); Schurr and Netschert (1960); Bureau of Economic Analysis (2011a).
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Sources: EIA (2010a); Schurr and Netschert (1960); Bureau of Economic Analysis (2011a).






























Figure 3     Difference between projected and actual 2008 oil demand 












Note: Negative numbers indicate demand was less than expected. Positive numbers indicate demand was greater than expected.
Sources: EIA (2003, 2010c); IEA (2002, 2010b).
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Figure 4     US trade deficit in oil and with China, 1900–2010











Sources: EIA (2010a); Schurr and Netschert (1960); Bureau of Economic Analysis (2011a).
    1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010
Trade deficit in oil
























Note: Verticle bars mark US recessions as defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER).
Sources: EIA (2011c); NBER (2011).
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Note: Green bars are OPEC members and blue bars are non-OPEC.
Sources: BP (2011); JODI (2011).
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Figure 7     Global oil demand, 1971–2035









OECD = Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
Sources: IEA (2010a, 2010b).






























Figure 8     Global oil production, 1971–2035
million barrels per day
OPEC = Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
Source: IEA (2010a, 2010b).





































Figure 9     Change in average annual US oil production, 2011–35 (thousand barrels per day)
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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Figure 10     Change in average annual oil price, 2011–35 (2009 US dollars per barrel)
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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Figure 11     Change in average annual US net oil imports, 2011–35 (thousand barrels per day)
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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6 Figure 12     Change in average annual US imported oil expenditures, 2011–35 (billions of 2009 US dollars)
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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2 Figure 13     Change in average annual US oil demand, 2011–35 (thousand barrels per day)
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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Figure 14     Change in average annual US oil expenditures, 2011–35 (billions of 2009 US dollars)
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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Table 1     US oil expenditures, 2011–35
Annual average (billions of 2009 US dollars)
2011–2015 2016–2020 2021–2025 2026–2030 2031–2035
Accelerate GoM Leasing and Permitting 769 875 927 967 1006
Increase Offshore Access 771 874 922 – 927  954 – 966 983 – 1,004
Enhanced Oil Recovery 771 874 929 970 1002
Heavy Duty Vehicle Standards 770 869 924 967 1002
Extended Light Duty Vehicle Standards 773 872 – 875 872 – 883 834 – 871 819 – 885
Building Efficiency Improvements 771 874 930 971 999
Advanced Biofuels Development 763 825 898 957 998
Natural Gas Vehicle Deployment 763 – 771 854 – 874 915 –9 31 956 – 973 992 – 1,006
Electric Vehicle Deployment 766 – 767 862 – 865 908 – 920 933  – 962 953 – 1,003
Carbon Tax 754 840 878 882 885
All Policies 729 – 738 736 – 767 723 – 766 714 – 771 700 – 768
Reduction from reference (billions 2009 US dollars and percent)
2011–2015 2016–2020 2021–2025 2026–2030 2031–2035
Absolute Percent Absolute Percent Absolute Percent Absolute Percent Absolute Percent
Accelerate GoM Leasing and Permitting 2.4 0.3 0.2 0.0 3.2 0.3 5.1 0.5 3.7 0.4
Increase Offshore Access — — 0.3 – 3.6 0. 0– 0.4 3.3 – 9.1 0.4 – 1 4.9 – 6.7 0.5 – 0.7 5.9 – 10.4 0.6 – 1.0
Enhanced Oil Recovery — — 1 0.1 1.5 0.2 2.5 0.3 7.1 0.7
Heavy Duty Vehicle Standards 0.8 0.1 5.7 0.7 7.1 0.8 5.3 0.6 7.6 0.8
Extended Light Duty Vehicle Standards — — 0.2 – 3.0 0.0 – 0.3 48.0 – 59.1 5.2 – 6.4 101.3 – 138.5 10.4 – 14.2 124.8 – 190.1 12.4 – 18.8
Building Efficiency Improvements 0.2 0 1.2 0.1 0.6 0.1 1 0.1 10.4 1.0
Advanced Biofuels Development 8.5 1.1 50.1 5.7 33.2 3.6 15.7 1.6 11.9 1.2
Natural Gas Vehicle Deployment 0.5 – 8.1 0.1 – 1.1 0.7 – 20.8 0.1 – 2.4 –0.2 – 15.3 0.0 – 1.7 –0.3 – 16.4 0.0 – 1.7 3.9 – 17.9 0.4 – 1.8
Electric Vehicle Deployment 3.7 – 5.3 0.5 – 0.7 9.5 – 13.3 1.1 – 1.5 11.0 – 22.9 1.2 – 2.5 10.0 – 39.5 1.0 – 4.1 6.8 – 56.8 0.7 – 5.6
Carbon Tax 17.4 2.3 34.6 4.0 52.9 5.7 90.4 9.3 124.6 12.3






























Figure 15     Change in average annual US energy expenditures, 2011–35 (billions of 2009 US dollars)
*Base case assumes all carbon tax revenue is returned to energy consumers. High case assumes all revenue is used for deficit reduction.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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8 Figure 16     Change in US Chamber of Commerce Index of Energy Security Risk, 2011–30
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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Table 2     US oil imports, 2011–35
Annual average (thousand barrels per day)
Policy proposal 2011–2015 2016–2020 2021–2025 2026–2030 2031–2035
Accelerate Gulf of Mexico Leasing 
and Permitting
9,776  9,342  8,884  8,722  8,688 
Increase Offshore Access 9,928  – 9,930  9,351 – 9,386 8,614 – 8,937 7,845 – 8,728 7,364 – 8,716
Enhanced Oil Recovery 9,935  9,369  8,980  8,806  8646  
Heavy Duty Vehicle Standards 9,918  9,334  9,028  8,950  8795  
Extended Light Duty Vehicle 
Standards
9,931 – 9,940 9,401 – 9,428   8,446 – 8,581 7,532 – 7,919 6,967 – 7,618
Building Efficiency Improvements 9,921  9,421  9,136  9,060  8,793 
Advanced Biofuels Development 9,806  8,898  8,634  8,815  8,772 
Natural Gas Vehicle Deployment 9,810 – 9,919 9,167 – 9,392  8,922 – 9,099 8,797 – 8,991 8,621 – 8,797
Electric Vehicle Deployment 9,861–9,885 9,264 – 9,297 8,866 – 8,992 8,558 – 8,882 8,210 – 8,749 
Carbon Tax 9,803  9,175  8,566  7,913  7,474 
All policies 9,337 – 9,466 7,708 – 8,092 5,981 – 6,774 4,809 – 5,986 4,309 – 5,718
Reduction from reference (thousand barrels per day and percent)
2011–2015 2016–2020 2021–2025 2026–2030 2031–2035
Absolute Percent Absolute Percent Absolute Percent Absolute Percent Absolute Percent
Accelerate Gulf of Mexico  Leasing 
and Permitting
156 –1.6 67   0.7 217   2.4 269   3.0 124   1.4
Increase Offshore Access — — 23 – 69 0.2 – 0.7 163 – 483 1.8 – 5.3 264 – 688 2.9 – 8.1 96 – 564 1.1 – 7.1
Enhanced Oil Recovery — — 40   0.4 121   1.3 186   2.1 165   1.9
Heavy Duty Vehicle Standards 14 0.1 75   0.8 73   0.8 41   0.5 17   0.2
Extended Light Duty Vehicle 
Standards
— — 0 – 7 0.0 – 0.1 520 – 654 5.7 – 7.2 1,073 – 1,459 11.9 – 16.2 1,194 – 1,845 13.6 – 20.9
Building Efficiency Improvements 11 0.1 –13   –0.1 –36   –0.4 –68   –0.8 19   0.2
Advanced Biofuels Development 126 1.3 511   5.4 466   5.1 177   2.0 40   0.5
Natural Gas Vehicle Deployment 14 – 122 0.1 – 1.2 17 – 242 0.2 – 2.6 2 – 179 0.0 – 2.0 1 – 194 0.0 – 2.2 15 – 191 0.2 – 2.2
Electric Vehicle Deployment 47 – 72 0.5 – 0.7 111 – 144 1.2 – 1.5 108 – 235 1.2 – 2.6 110 – 433 1.2 – 4.8 63 – 602 0.7 – 6.8
Carbon Tax 129 1.3 233   2.5 535   5.9 1078   12.0 1338   15.2
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